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Abstract 
Social cognitive development is a phenomenon psychologists have studied for 
many years. Recent studies have focused on children's understanding of a theory of 
mind, that is, understanding what it means to say that someone thinks, believes, or knows 
something. In other words, a theory ofmind represents an understanding of epistemic 
mental states that humans use to describe, predict, and explain behavior (Baron-Cohen, 
1996). 
The present study examined the relation between a developing theory of mind and 
language ability, by specifically examining changes in children's understanding of the 
feelings, thoughts, and actions of storybook characters. Children (n=21; aged 34 to 60 
months) were given pre-tests and a post-test involving false belieftasks, deception tasks, 
and language comprehension, in order to detect differences in individual scores before 
and after children were read 14 different stories rich in mental state situations. These 
readings occurred over a 4-5 week period at the child's day care center or nursery school. 
The storybook sessions were taped in order to examine trends and patterns in the 
children's developing theory ofmind. These data were collected as part of a larger study 
examining the impact ofcumulative experiences with mental-state rich narratives on false 
belief understanding where preliminary analyses indicated that overall, scores improved 
from pre-test to post-test (n=38). In the present study, "correct" responses to questions 
elicited from the children during the storybook readings were assessed for three types of 
questions: The definitions and description of mental state phenomena, reality 
understanding, and explanations ofmental-state related behaviors. Numbers of correct 
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responses to these three question types were examined with respect to children's 
performance on the language and theory of mind measures. 
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Narrative Understanding and Theory ofMind in Preschoolers 
Acquisition of folk psychological or "common-sense" principles of the mind 
requires a theory that human action is a consequence of mental states such as thoughts, 
beliefs, desires, and intentions (Frye & Moore, 1991; Knoll & Charman, 2000). A theory 
of mind is a system for inferring the full range of mental states in self and others from 
behavior (Baron-Cohen, 1996; Whiten, 1994). A theory of mind is vital to acquire 
because if one can accurately assess another individual's thoughts and feelings, one is 
better able to understand, interpret, and predict that person's actions and behaviors 
(Ritblatt, 2000; Watson, Wilson, Nixon, & Capage, 1999). 
While all normal human adults have this theory, individuals are not born with it. 
Investigations of the development of a theory of mind began because of a controversial 
study in which chimpanzee understanding of mental states was being compared to that of 
children (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). While the chimps did not show the ability to 
infer mental states from behavior, children were found to incorporate mental state 
understanding into knowledge about behavior at approximately age four (Astington & 
Gopnik, 1991; Knoll & Charman 2000; Bower, 1993). Although most research supports 
this development trajectory, there are still many questions about how a theory of mind is 
acquired. The purpose of the present study was to examine three- and four-year old 
children's increasing understanding of theory of mind concepts. Children's behavior 
during storybook reading sessions with an adult, who provided a great deal of information 
about the mental state-behavior relations present in the story (in the form of elaborations 
and questions), was assessed. 
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Background 
Since Premack and Woodruffs groundbreaking study with primates, the main test 
of a theory ofmind in children assesses an understanding of false belief. Understanding 
false beliefs implies that an individual has the ability to distinguish unambiguously 
between their own current (true) belief and a different (false) belief they themselves held 
earlier, or a different (false) beliefthat another individual holds (Dennett, 1978). In order 
to test this understanding, multiple simple tasks have been developed. For example, in 
the "unexpected contents" task, a child is shown a tube of Smarties (a type of candy) and 
asked to state the contents of the tube. After the child answers, the true and surprising 
contents (a pencil) are revealed. The lid is then replaced and the child is asked what they 
thought was inside when they first saw the tube (a question about a false belief the self 
had) and what a classmate would say was in the tube were it to be shown to them (a 
question about a false belief another person has). In this task, the critical test questions 
determine whether the child can recall their prior (and now overtaken) belief about the 
tube's contents, and whether they can override their own current knowledge state to 
predict what someone else would believe about the tube's contents. Three-year-olds have 
difficulties reasoning about false beliefs, but four-year-olds perform well on these tasks 
(Pemer, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987). 
Other types of appearance-reality distinctions have also been utilized in 
arrangements offalse beliefs. For example, Harris and Gross (1988) demonstrated that 
young children are unable to acknowledge that a sponge can look like a rock and that 
someone who is smiling could actually feel unhappy. That is, the younger children can 
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not acknowledge the distinction between real and apparent substances and real and 
apparent emotion. They seemed to be unable to appreciate that an object can look like 
one thing, but really be something else, or that the way in which emotion is experienced 
can be different than how it is expressed (Mitchell, 1997). Older children can easily 
make these discriminations. 
Advances in language development must certainly be critical to these age 
differences, even if only because false belief tasks involve complex language. Language 
ability is, in fact, associated with development in this domain. In a longitudinal study, 
language ability at 24 months accurately predicted false belief understanding at 48 
months (Watson, Painter, & Bornstein, 2001). At 24 months, children were given a 
structured language assessment, the Reynell Developmental Language Scales-Revised 
(Reynell & Huntley, 1985). Then, measures of verbal intelligence and false belief were 
taken within a month of each child's fourth birthday. Results indicated that both the early 
language factor score and the 48-month verbal IQ were positively correlated with 48­
month false belief understanding. However, above and beyond language skill, 
environmental factors that create situations in which concepts relating to a theory of mind 
might be learned are also important to consider in attempting to understand the 
developmental transition in theory of mind that takes place during preschool years. 
Family variables, for example, number of siblings, are associated with a child's 
theory of mind (Astington, 2001; Jenkins & Astington, 1996; Perner, Ruffman, & 
Leekam, 1994). This finding suggests that children from larger families have more 
opportunity to engage in the types of social interactions that contain information about 
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mental concepts. Contrasting perspectives, such as responsibility for wrongful actions 
and cooperative play, occur more frequently in larger families. In addition, the child's 
social behavior, or talk about feeling states and the amount ofcooperation he/she has with 
siblings, assessed in the second year, accurately predicts performance on false belief task 
in the third year (Watson et al., 1999). Similarly, social interactions with peers in the 
school setting are also associated with false-belief understanding. Specifically, behaviors 
observed during a pretend play session with peers such as joint proposals for false 
pretense (e.g., "Let's make cookies") and the explicit assignment of roles (e.g., "You be 
the mommy") were positively correlated with theory ofmind understanding (Astington & . 
Jenkins, 1995). 
Children's experiences with narrative in the form of storybook reading may be 
another place where theory ofmind concepts are learned (Charman & Schmueli-Goetz, 
1998; Lewis, Freeman, Hagestadt, & Douglas, 1994). All narrative involves a great deal' 
ofdiscussion about why people are doing the things they are doing based on their mental 
states. For example, it is uninteresting to know that Papa is going up to the attic to make 
a costume out ofan old sheet. This behavior, however, comes alive when the reader 
realizes that Papa Bear is doing this act with the intention to scare the cub scouts on their 
camping trip. The world of stories, like the world of family, might be a means through 
which children develop, practice, and redescribe theory ofmind concepts to more 
complex levels (Femyhough, 1998; Karmiloff-Smith, 1995). Improvement in false belief 
understanding through enhanced exposure to theory ofmind concepts in the naturalistic 
setting of storybook reading has been demonstrated. Guajardo and Watson (2002) found 
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that with a sufficient sample size, individual training and adequate inclusion criterion, 
training in multiple scripted discussions about false beliefs, deception, and appearance­
reality during storybook reading sessions led to improvements in performance on 
measures of false belief and deception. Furthermore, while scores on the theory of mind 
tasks of both training and a no training groups improved across time, the training group 
improved significantly more than the no training condition. 
The purpose ofthis study was to broaden our understanding of the development of 
theory ofmind by gaining a better understanding ofwhat happens during storybook 
reading sessions like those used in Guajardo and Watson (2002). This study examined 
the verbal behavior of children during multiple storybook reading sessions. Children's 
responses to questions about concepts related to a theory ofmind, such as appearance­
reality and deception, were examined (e.g., "Did Mrs. Moore really see a suit?" and "Why 
is the boy wearing a disguise?"). The changes in the ability to correctly answer these 
questions were examined in relation to pre- and post-test scores on several theory of mind 
measures, as well as each child's level oflanguage ability. Based on previous research, 
we expected language ability to strongly predict theory of mind ability. We hypothesized 
that improvement in children's ability to correctly answer questions about concepts 
related to theory ofmind will predict improvement from pre-test to post-test. 
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Method 
Participants 
Twenty-one 3- to 4-year-old participants were drawn from a larger data set (N = 
38) for the purpose of this study. The children were predominantly white, and from 
middle class families in three pre-schools in a medium-size, midwestern city. Thirteen 
girls (mean age of 47.31 months) and eight boys (mean age of 48.25 months) participated. 
Specifics have been omitted for purposes of confidentiality. 
Design 
The current study included a pre-test, a post-test, and a training session in 
between. The mean amount of time for each child between the pre-test and post-test was 
46.29 days (24-96, SD = 26.6). Several trained, college-age students conducted the pre­
test, post-test, and training for each child to guarantee that any changes in the children's 
perfonnance on the measures from pre-test to post-test were not related to familiarity 
between the examiner and the participant. Training sessions were all audio-taped and 
then transcribed in order to ensure accuracy and reliability. The examiner recorded 
children's responses on the pre- and post-tests at the time of assessment. 
Pretest 
Prior to conducting the training sessions, the children were pre-tested on three 
measures of false belief, two deception tasks, and a language assessment. A description 
of each measure follows. Children were tested individually on two separate occasions in 
a quiet part of their school. During one 10-20 minute session, the children received the 
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language measure, and during a second 10-15 minute session, they received the theory of 
mind measures. 
False BeliefAssessment. Children's theory ofmind was assessed during the pre­
and post-tests using the following tasks. The first false belief task is the "change in 
location" task, in which the children were told a story about Maxi and her mother (for 
girls; for boys, it was Max and his mother). The story was acted out for each child with 
small dolls and replica objects. In the story, Maxi and her mother return from the grocery 
store and put the chocolate they bought in the cupboard. Then, while Maxi is out of the 
room, her Mother moves the chocolate from the cupboard to the green cupboard. Before 
asking the children the test questions, the experimenter asked them three unscored 
comprehension questions to ensure that they understood the story: (a) "Where did the 
chocolate used to be?" (b) "Where is the chocolate now?" and (c) "Did Maxi see the 
chocolate being moved?" If the children answered any of these questions incorrectly, 
they were corrected. Next, the children were asked to answer two test questions: (a) 
"Where will Maxi think the chocolate is when she comes back?" and (b) Where will 
Maxi first look for the chocolate when she comes back?" The correct response to the 
question was "The blue cupboard." After the children had been told the story of Maxi 
and asked the previous test questions, the experimenter asked them to consider another 
possibility. In this "deception task" scenario, Maxi is trying to deceive her sister, who 
wants the chocolate. For the test question, the children were asked, "Where will Maxi tell 
her sister the chocolate is?" Children received a score of 1 for a correct response of "the 
green cupboard" and a score of 0 for the incomect response, "the blue cupboard." 
Theory ofMind 12 
Next, the experimenter gave the second false belief task, the "unexpected 
contents-representational change" task, which asked the children questions concerning 
their understanding of their own representational change, using an unexpected contents 
task (Lewis & Osborne, 1990). Children were shown a Band-Aid box and asked, "What 
do you think is inside the box?" Then, they were shown the contents of the box, a toy 
car. Next, the box was closed, and the experimenter asked the children the first test 
question: "What do you think was in the box?" If the children responded that they 
thought Band-Aids were in the box, they received a score of2. If the children did not 
answer the first question correctly, the experimenter provided a prompt: "What did you 
think was in the box before I took the top off?" If the children answered the prompt 
question correctly (e.g. they thought the Band-Aids were in the box), they received a 
score of 1. If the children answered both questions incorrectly, they received a score ofO. 
Following the test questions, the experimenter asked the children a memory question­
"Can you remember what is inside the box?"-in order to affirm that they remembered 
the inside of the box. 
The second part of the unexpected contents task included the third false belief 
task, the "unexpected contents-explanation" task, in which the children were shown the 
same Band-Aid box and a similar unmarked box containing Band-Aids. Following the 
procedure ofBartsch and Wellman (1989), the experimenter showed the children a doll 
named Maxi (or Max) and told them that she has a cut, and wants a Band-Aid. The doll 
then approached the actual Band-Aid box, and the children were asked the critical test 
question: "Why do you think she is looking in there?" Children who gave the correct 
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response (Maxi looked in the Band-Aid box because she thought it contained Band-Aids) 
received a score of 2. If the children either did not respond or did not mention beliefs, the 
experimenter provided a response. Children who answered both questions incorrectly 
received a score of O. Finally, the experimenter asked the children an unscored reality 
question: "Are the Band-Aids there really?" to ensure that they recalled the true contents 
of the box. 
In the second deception task, the "change in location and deception," the children 
were led through a task that involved actively deceiving a character (Lalonde & Chandler, 
1995). They were again introduced to a doll named Maxi (or Max) and then were told 
that John knows there was candy in the green drawer but that he has to leave the room for 
a while. While John was "gone" the experimenter told the children, "Let's playa trick 
on John. Let's move the candy to the blue drawer." After the children moved the candy 
to the blue drawer, they were asked two test questions: (a) "Where will John think the 
candy is?" and (b) "When John comes back into the room, where will he first look for the 
candy?" Children received a score of 1 for each correct response of "the green drawer" 
and a score of 0 for each incorrect response, "the blue drawer" (Guajardo & Watson, 
2002) (See Appendix A for Sample Pre-test). 
Language. Previous research indicates that language comprehension is correlated 
with theory ofmind performance and therefore needs to be controlled for in assessing 
relations between pre-tests, post-tests, and data collected during training (e.g., Astington 
& Jenkins, 1995). The Test for the Auditory Comprehension of Language-Revised 
consists ofthree sub-scales assessing various aspects ofverbal ability (word 
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comprehension, morphology, and sentence comprehension) (TACL-R; Carrow-Woolfolk, 
1985). All three sub-scales were administered to each child. For each item, the 
experimenter read a word, a group ofwords, or a sentence to the child and instructed the 
child to point to one of three pictures that best corresponded to the experimenter's 
utterance. Standard scoring procedures were used. 
Storybook Reading 
Upon completion of the pre-test, children participated in 14 audiotaped 
bookreading sessions across five weeks. Each session involved the reading of a 
storybook to the child by the experimenter. Two storybook orders were used-one for 
the first data collection period and one for the second data collection period, in order to 
assure that change in scores was not related to the storybook order. During the session, 
the experimenter asked questions pertaining to the character's thoughts and actions using 
a story script for each story. The children's books and accompanying scripts contained 
multiple references to theory ofmind concepts-similar to those tested for in the pre- and 
post-test (Cassidy et aI., 1998). Trained research assistants administered these sessions. 
Before the start ofeach session, the child was asked ifhe or she wanted to 
participate in the story-telling session and told that they had the option of stopping at any 
time. Children were also told that they would be asked some questions regarding the 
stories throughout the session. 
Each story was specifically chosen to reflect some aspect of theory ofmind. For 
example, The Berenstain Bears in the Dark book centers around a series of appearance­
reality situations, which require theory ofmind reasoning. This story is about cubs that 
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are afraid of the dark because they imagine things that are not true. Throughout the story, 
theory ofmind concepts is highlighted through a prepared script. Some comments 
include, "In the attic, Sister thought things looked like scary shapes, but then she knew it 
was just some old tools" and "So we make believe that things in the dark are scary things, 
but they aren't really. We make up things in our mind that aren't real." Other stories 
asked about false belief or deception. Children's responses to these comments and 
questions in the scripts are coded as definition, reality understanding, and mental state 
understanding, as used in Guajardo and Watson (in press). A full list of stories and a 
sample script is included in Appendix B. 
Post-Test 
Children were tested on the same false belief, appearance-reality, and deception 
tasks that were used for the pre-test. However, all tasks were modified to include use of . 
different specific items to each scenario. For example, in the unexpected 
contents/representational change task, a toy boat rather than a toy car was used. 
Transcription 
Once all the data tapes were collected, the researcher and assistants listened to all 
the storybook training session tapes and transcribed them onto a Microsoft Word 
template. Initially, each file was separated by participant. Later, the data was organized 
by each of the fourteen stories. Once this was complete, every individual question from 
the storybook script was coded into one of three question types: definition questions (e.g. 
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"Do you remember what a trick is?" & "What is an imagination?"), reality understanding 
questions (e.g. "Did Ms. Moore really see a suit?" & "Who is wearing the disguise 
now?") and mental state understanding questions (e.g. "Why did the little boy wear the 
disguise?" & "Why did he say the suit was super?") (A sample of coding is found in 
Appendix B). There were a total of 131 questions within the fourteen storybook scripts, 
broken down into thirteen definition questions, fifty-six reality understanding questions, 
and sixty-two mental state understanding questions. 
In order to check the reliability of the coding manual, all of the questions were 
given to a research assistant to code. The inter-rater reliability for the coding manual was 
93.08%. In order to figure this percent accuracy, a research assistant was given all of the 
scripts for the stories and asked to designate each question as a definition, reality 
understanding, or mental state understanding question. Then, the coding manual was 
compared to the answers the research assistant deemed as correct. 
Results 
Table 1 shows the mean performance by gender on the major variables. The only 
variable that was significantly different by gender was the TACL-R score, which was 
expected because girls, in this age range, usually show advanced language ability 
compared to boys (Bomstein & Haynes, 1998). Therefore, all further analyses were 
collapsed across gender. 
Test scores significantly improved from the pre-test (M = 2.33, SD = 1.49, range = 
oto 6) to the post-test (M= 3.95, SD = 1.83, range = 1 to 7), F(1,20) = 18.68,p < .001, 
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TJ2 = .48, replicating Guajardo and Watson's (2001) findings, which showed that the 
storybook training session improves children's theory ofmind skills compared to changes 
in pre- and post-test scores for children who have not had training. 
Percent correct responding to the training questions embedded in the stories was 
analyzed by type: definition, reality understanding, and mental state understanding. There 
was an effect ofquestion type in correct responding (F (l,20) = 66.12, p < .01). Post hoc 
tests revealed that definition questions were harder to answer correctly (13% correct) than 
reality understanding (44.7%) or mental state understanding (36.6%) questions (p < .001) 
and mental state understanding questions were harder to answer correctly than reality 
understanding questions (p < .01). 
In order to assess differences from the beginning to the end of training in percent 
correct responding to the embedded questions, a 3 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted involving the three types of questions and correct responding to the first four . 
and last four stories (See Table 2). There was a main effect of question type utilizing the 
data from the first and last four story questions, replicating the previous analyses with 
answers to all questions used, F (2,19) = 22.83, p < .001. However, there was also an 
interaction effect (question type x first four/last four percent correct), F (2,19) = 20.83, p 
< .001, and post hoc tests revealed that there was only a significant change from the first 
four questions to the last four questions for definition questions (t (20) = -2.36, p < .05, 
for the percent correct definition; t (20) = -.039, n.s. for the percent correct reality 
understanding; t (20) = -.71, n.s. for the percent correct mental state understanding). 
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Table 3 shows the correlation matrix for TACL-R, pre-test, and post-test. All 
variables are correlated with one another, which indicates that the pre- and post-test are 
good measures for measuring the change in theory ofmind. In addition, the TACL-R 
score is correlated to the post-test, but not the pre-test, which is fairly consistent with 
previous research. 
Table 4 shows the correlations of the three main assessments in the pre- and post­
testing with the total correct answers per question type in the storybook reading sessions. 
The correlations between the theory ofmind pre- and post-test scores and the three 
question types are all significant, which illustrates that correct responding to the story 
questions and the tests were related (p < .05). The language assessment, TACL-R, was 
only significantly correlated to correct responding to the definition questions. Based 
upon previous research, it was hypothesized that the language scores would be related to 
all of the question types because all question types reflect specific theory ofmind 
concepts. 
We wanted to investigate if the change from the beginning of the training to the 
end oftraining was associated with the ToM change (change in score from pre- to post­
test). Therefore, a computation of the change in percent correct responding between the 
first four and last four stories was done. Table 5 shows the correlations between change in 
percent correct responding to each question type with age, language ability, and pre- to 
post-test theory ofmind task change. Both age and TACL-R scores were significantly 
associated with change for the reality understanding questions, and marginally significant 
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with the definition questions, and none of the other correlations were significant. Change 
in the theory ofmind scores were not significant to any question type. 
Discussion 
Guajardo and Watson (2002) found that children do improve on theory of mind 
tasks from pre- to post-test in the training session compared to a non-training control 
group. The results of the present study also found that mean scores from pre-test to post­
test changed significantly and additionally, the mean percent correct responses increased 
from the first four stories to the last four stories for one of the question types (definition). 
In other words, the results of the present study indicate that participation in discussions of 
mental-state behavior relations within the context of narrative was linked to 
improvements in both the ability to answer some questions during the reading sessions 
and in performance on theory ofmind tests. However, change scores from theory ofmind 
pre- to post-test were not significantly correlated with change scores in total percent 
correct responding to questions (collapsed across question type) from the first stories to 
the last four stories. Clearly, the storybook training session was effective, as evidenced 
by the significant change in pre- to post-test scores. Unfortunately, we were unsuccessful 
in tracking learning within the training session. Our hypothesis, that pre-test to post-test 
scores would be reflected in our measure ofchild behavior during the training sessions, 
namely, the percent correct scores on the three question types, was not strongly supported. 
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We did see a significant change over reading sessions in the definition questions. 
Therefore, the definition may have been a better assessment of theory of mind 
understanding than the reality understanding and mental state understanding questions. 
This idea is supported by the fact that only the definition questions were linked to 
language. This is a surprising fmding because it is contrary to previous fmdings, which 
have shown the link between language and theory of mind ability (Watson et aI., 1999; 
Watson, Bomstein, & Painter, 2001; Astington et al., 2001). The difference in correct 
responding to definition questions versus reality understanding and mental state 
understanding may mean that the definition questions may be a more sensitive measure. 
Reality understanding questions and mental state understanding questions may not have 
been a good measure of theory of mind because children may have been able to simply 
repeat what was just heard in the story or use the picture to answer the question. This is 
vital to examine further because if this was, in fact, taking place, then the latter two 
question types were ineffective in testing theory ofmind. On the other hand, definition 
questions required the children to engage in critical thinking and produce an original 
answer. In fact, previous research has specifically linked the correct use ofmental state 
terms in naturalistic language samples with performance on the theory ofmind false 
belief tasks (Moore & Furrow). Perhaps the inclusion of additional definition questions 
would have been beneficial since it seemed to be a more sensitive measure. Therefore, 
further investigation into what types of question probes might reflect learning should be 
conducted. 
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For future research, some changes in the method could help to determine how the 
theory of mind changes are associated to the pre- to post-test change. First, the storybook 
reading sessions were only audiotaped because it was the most efficient way for 
researchers to go from school to school on a fairly regular basis. If the storybook sessions 
were videotaped, researchers would be able to investigate nonverbal cues of cognitive 
learning that the researcher may have otherwise not noticed. Specifically, a video tape 
could be examined for evidence of the child showing joint attention, looking at the reader, 
and pointing to specific parts ofpictures in the storybook. Looking at these levels of 
engagement may help to determine measures that would more accurately coincide with 
individual differences in pre- to post-test changes. Perhaps the children who showed the 
most change in their pre- to post-test scores were the children who were paying close 
attention to both the story and the researcher for the majority of the time. The videotape 
would help to determine if the child was in fact, paying attention, and therefore benefiting 
from the storybook training, or if he/she was simply hearing the story and not necessarily 
listening actively. 
In conclusion, the present study supported, but did not extend previous research 
on understanding mental state concepts in theory of mind development. Additional 
research including more examination of type ofknowledge probe question and evaluation 
of attention behaviors during the training sessions is suggested. 
• 
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Table 1 
Means (ranges and standard deviations in parentheses) and T-tests ofVariables by 
Gender (N=21) 
Variable Girls Boys t-tests 
Age 47.31 (34-60, 7.72) 48.25 (39-57, 5.99) t (19) = -.29 
TACL-R 53.00 (33-87, 14.96) 36.00 (9-66, 18.02) t (19) = 2.34 * 
ToM Pre-test 2.38 (1-6, 1.66) 2.25 (0-4, 1.28) t (19) = .20 
ToM Post-test 4.23 (1-7, 1.83) 3.50 (1-7, 1.85) t (19) = .88 
Definition (% Correct) 14.79 (0-46, 13.12) 10.58 (0-23, 8.16) t (19) = .81 
Reality (% Correct) 46.70 (14-70, 17.90) 40.85 (20-71, 16.85) t(19) =.74 
Mental State (% Correct) 38.09 (11-68, 17.71) 33.27 (24-61, 12.07) t (19) = .68 
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Table 2 
Mean percent correct responses by question type for two methods ofcomparison 
First Four Stories Last Four Stories 
Definition 9.52 18.1 
Reality Understanding 51.50 51.76 
Mental State Understanding 34.9 38.6 
•
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Table 3
 
Correlation Matrix ofthe Three Main Assessments (N = 21)
 
TACL-R 
Pre-test 
Post-test 
TACL-R 
.34 
.59** 
Pre-test 
.34 
.48 
Post-test 
.59** 
.48* 
* Significant at the 0.05 level (I-tailed) 
** Significant at the 0.01 level (I-tailed) 
•
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Table 4
 
Correlation ofQuestion Types to Assessments 
TACL-R 
Pre-test 
Post-Test 
Total Definition 
.553* 
.405* 
.509* 
* Significant (one-tailed) at p<.05 
**Significant (one-tailed) atp<.005 
Total Reality
 
.144
 
.402* 
.467* 
Total Mental State
 
.354
 
.504** 
.429* 
•
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Table 5 
Correlation ofPercent Correct Responding Change (by Question Type) to Other 
Variables 
Definition 
Reality 
Mental State 
Age 
.25 
.55* 
.03 
*Significant (two-tailed) at p < .05 
**Significant (two-tailed) at p < .01 
TACL-R Score 
.31 
.55** 
-.09 
ToM Change 
-.07 
.18 
-.17 
•
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Appendix A: Theory of Mind Pre-Test for Girls 
UNEXPECTED CHANGE IN LOCATION TASK (Girl) 
Subject # _ Date, _ 
Experimenter _ 
score 
[girl doll present representing Maxi waiting for her mother; kitchen cabinet on table]
 
Maxi's mom comes back from the grocery store. She bought a chocolate cake. Maxi helps her
 
put away the things and she asks her mom where she should put the cake. "In the blue cabinet,"
 
her mom says.
 
Maxi puts the chocolate cake into the blue cabinet.
 
[Place miniature chocolate cake in the blue cabinet.]
 
Maxi decides to go to the playground. But she remembers exactly where she put the chocolate
 
cake so she can come back and get some later. She loves chocolate cake. Then she leaves for the
 
playground.
 
[The doll is removed.]
 
Maxi's mom also likes chocolate cake. She takes the cake out of the blue cabinet and gets a little
 
bit of frosting on her finger for a taste. And then she does not put it back into the blue cabinet but
 
into the red cabinet.
 
[Transfer chocolate cake to red from the blue cabinet to the red cabinet.]
 
Now Maxi's mom realizes that she forgot to buy eggs. So she goes to her neighbor for some eggs.
 
Maxi back from the playground, hungry, and she wants to get some chocolate cake.
 
[Doll reappears.]
 
She still remembers where she put the chocolate cake.
 
Control Questions:
 
1. Where did the chocolate cake used to be? Blue Red 
2. Where is it right now?	 Blue Red 
3. Did Maxi see it being moved? No Yes 
Test Questions: 
1.	 Where will Maxi first look for the chocolate cake when she comes back into the room? 
Blue Red 
•
 
Theory of Mind 32 
DECEPTION TASK (Girl) 
Subject # _ Date _ 
Experimenter _ 
score 
[Place a crayon box, a cereal box, and the appropriate doll on the table.]
 
Now let's do another story about Maxi. She took the cereal out of this cereal box and put it in
 
this crayon box so that her brother Bruce would not find it.
 
[Show the child the cereal in the crayon box and the empty cereal box.]
 
Maxi does not want her brother to eat the cereal. When Bruce comes into the room he asks Maxi
 
where the cereal is. Maxi decides to tell her brother something completely wrong so that her
 
brother will not find the cereal.
 
Test Question:
 
1. Where will Maxi say the cereal is? Cereal Crayon 
PROMPT (if answers cereal): Where is the cereal really? Cereal Crayon 
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UNEXPECTED CONTENTS-REPRESENTATIONAL CHANGE TASK (Girl) 
Subject # _ Date _ 
Experimenter _ 
score 
[A Band-Aid box is placed on the table in front of the child.] 
Look at this box. What do you think is inside the box? 
Band-Aids Other _ 
Let's look inside. Look, there is a toy car in here. Imagine that, a Band-Aid box with a toy car inside! 
[Close box.] 
Test Questions: 
1. What did you think was in the box? Band-Aids Other _ 
If child answers incorrectly, prompt with: What did you think was in the box before I opened it? 
Band-Aids Other _ 
If child answers correctly, ask What's really inside the box? 
Band-Aids Other _ 
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UNEXPECfED CONTENTS-EXPLANAnON TASK (Girl) 
•
 
Subject # _ Date _ 
Experimenter _ 
score 
[The Band-Aid box and a similar, solid colored box containing Band-Aids is placed on the table in front
 
of the child.]
 
"Let's see what is inside of here. Look, there are Band-Aids in this box! There are Band-Aids in this box
 
and a toy car in the Band-Aid box."
 
[Oose both boxes. Place the boy doll on the table.]
 
"Look, here is Maxi again. Maxi has a cut. And she wants a Band-Aid."
 
[The doll then approaches the Band-Aid box and starts to open it, without revealing its contents.]
 
Test Question:
 
1. Why is she looking in there? 
If child makes no reference to thoughts/beliefs, provide prompt: What does Maxi think? 
Prompt if child answers correctly: Are the Band-Aids there really? No Yes 
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ACTIVE DECEPTION TASK (Girl) 
Subject # _ Date. _ 
Experimenter _ 
score 
[The cupboard is set on the table along with boy doll. A bunch of grapes is contained in the green 
cabinet.]
 
Ok, now we're going to tell another story with Maxi. Maxi knows that there are grapes in the green
 
cabinet.
 
[Show the child the grapes in the green cabinet.]
 
Maxi has to leave the room for a minute.
 
[Remove the doll.]
 
Let's playa trick on Maxi. Let's move the grapes to the orange cabinet.
 
[Have the child place the grapes in the orange cabinet.]
 
Control Questions:
 
1. Where did the grapes used to be?	 Orange Green 
2. Where is it now?	 Orange Green 
3. Did Maxi see them being moved? Yes No 
Test Questions: 
1. Where will Maxi first look for the grapes when she comes back into the room?
 
Orange Green
 
2.	 If child answers correctly, ask: Will she find the grapes there? 
Yes No 
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Appendix B: Theory ofMind Script 
Story: Calmenson, S. (1989). The Principal's New Clothes. New York, NY: Scholastic, Inc. 
Topic: Trickery 
Starting Question: Do you remember what a trick is? (DEFINITION ?) Was there ever a time someone tricked 
you? What happened? Sometimes people trick us just to be funny, but sometimes they do it to be mean. 
Now we are going to hear a story about how some thieves tricked the principal of the school. 
Pg.4 - Do you know what a trickster is?(Someone who tricks people.) They are making Mr. Bundy think something 
that is not true. (DEFINITION ?) 
Pg. 9 - Ivy and Moe are going to trick Principal Bundy. What are they going to do? (MENTAL STATE 
UNDERSTANDING ?) 
Pg. 14 - Did Mrs. Moore really see a suit? (No) Why did she say the suit was beautiful? (So people would not think 
she is silly.) (REALITY UNDERSTANDING?; MENTAL STATE UNDERSTANDING?) 
Pg. 21 - Did Roger really see a suit? (No) Why did he say the suit was super? (REALITY UNDERSTANDING?) 
Pg. 23 - Did Principal Bundy really see the suit? (No) Why did he say the suit was fantastic? (REALITY 
UNDERSTANDING? ; MENTAL STATE UNDERSTANDING?) 
Pg. 25 - See, Principal Bundy is having a dream about being in the cold. You can see what he is thinking in the 
bubble. 
Pg. 32 - So the little girl knew that Principal Bundy didn't really have a suit on. 
Conclusions: So Ivy and Moe tricked the principal. Did they really make him a suit? (No). Sometime people trick 
other people. They try to make them think something that is not true. Ivy and Moe tried to make Principal 
Bundy think they really make him a suit, but he just couldn't see it. (REALITY UNDERSTANDING ?) 
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Full List of Stories Used 
Why a Disguise? 
Principal's New Clothes 
Moongame 
Miss Nelson is Missing 
Hog-Eye 
I Thought I Heard 
The Berenstain Bears in the Dark 
Miss Nelson is Back 
Berenstain Bears and Trick or Treat 
Seven Blind Mice 
Berenstain Bears and the Ghost of the Forest 
Borguita and the Coyote 
How Spider Tricked Snake 
Timothy and the Night Noises 
